GLOSSOLOGIA 11-12 (2000) 229-256

ETHIC DATIVE: SYNTAX AND AFFECT*

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This paper investigates how affect is morphologically represented in language through the ethic dative (genitive) in MG. We have examined previous accounts within traditional grammar (Tzartzanos 1946) and the GB framework (Catsimali 1989) and have concluded that this construction can be satisfactorily explained only by applying theories which recognize that syntactic phenomena are closely interrelated with semantico-pragmatic ones. In that direction we adopt Janda's (1989, 1993) schematic representation and apply a cognitive linguistic approach. In examining ditransitivity and affect, we show that there is socio-cultural pressure exerted on syntactic structures. Specifically, we argue that this construction exhibits the relatively high value placed on interpersonal involvement, as well as an orientation towards positive politeness in the specific linguistic community. We conclude that the genitive-dative in MG depends on the interaction of three cognitive domains, i.e., (i) agentivity, (ii) possession, and (iii) affectedness of the recipient, all of which are graded.

1. Introduction: language and affect

The motivation for this paper stemmed from our interest in how affect is morphosyntactically represented in language, an issue given insufficient attention in current linguistic analyses; in our view, this is probably because English, which is the most widely analysed language, exhibits little overlap between the system of language and that of affect. Unsurprisingly, Talmy (1997: 10) isolates only four categories of closed class forms indicating affect in English and observes that "the low rank [of affect] militates against grammaticization". One of the few linguistic categories which Talmy (ibid.) identifies as indicating affect in English is traditionally called "ethic dative" or "dative of interest", although he chooses to call it "the undergoer construction", e.g. *my plants all died on me.*

Indo-European (IE) languages other than English as well as non-IE ones

* We would like to express our gratitude to our colleagues D. Theophanopoulou-Kontou, K. Nikiforidou, C. Canakis, J. Hannah and P. Trudgill for instructive comments and bibliographical suggestions.

have been shown to involve a more systematic incorporation of emotive/affective material in overt linguistic categories both lexical and syntactic. These languages include Albanian, Bulgarian (Katsanis and Dinas 1986), Czech, French, German, Greek, Russian, Spanish (Wierzbicka 1981, Janda 1989) and Japanese (see Ono 1988, Kuno and Kaburaki 1977). Compare the following examples of IE dative and corresponding Japanese passive constructions from Ono (ibid. 36-37).

JAPANESE

1. Watasi {wa/ga} Taroo ni ude no hone o or - are-ta.
   'I' TOP NOM Taro DAT arm GEN bone ACC break-PASS-PRET
   'I got the arm broken by Taro.'

GERMAN

2. (i) Er hat <u>mir</u> den Arm gebrochen. 'He broke my arm.'
   (ii) (a) Der Arm wurde <u>mir</u> gebrochen. 'My arm was broken.'
   (b) <u>Mir</u> wurde der Arm gebrochen. 'My arm was broken.'

FRENCH

3. Il <u>m</u>'a cassé le bras. 'He broke my arm.'

GREEK

4. <u>Μου</u> έσπασε το χέρι. 'He/She broke my arm.'

JAPANESE

5. Watasi {wa/ga} kodomo ni nak-are-ta.
   'I' TOP NOM child DAT cry-PASS-PRET
   'My child cried (and I was negatively affected by it.)'

POLISH

6. Dziecko <u>mi</u> pacze.
   Child 1.SG. DAT cries
   'My child is crying, I'm negatively affected by it.'

GREEK

7. <u>Μου</u> κλαίει το παιδί μου. 'My child is crying me-GEN'

Ethic dative in particular has received a lot of attention in classical IE struc-

turalist analyses (e.g. Brugman and Delbrück 1911, Krahe 1972)[1] but has been overlooked, as far as we know, in current linguistic examinations, despite the fact that interest in the indirect object (IO) dative has revived within the Chomskyan tradition (e.g. Larson 1988, Gropen et al. 1989, Emonds 1993). One major factor contributing to the neglect of ethic dative is the long-standing commitment of the Chomskyan tradition to restricting linguistic analysis to a kind of syntax which is independent of semantico-pragmatic considerations, contextual information or interaction with 'extra-linguistic' elements. The so-called 'IO movement' has raised serious problems within this tradition and has been accounted for in two ways: either using structure preserving operations such as the Projection Principle (e.g. Emonds 1972, Whitney 1982, 1983) or using lexical rules (e.g. Green 1974, Oerhle 1976, Jackendoff 1990). Emonds (1993: 260) proposes lexicon-independent principles of syntax which are notably "semantics-determining".

Using natural data from Modern Greek (MG), we intend to show that constructions such as Modern Greek 'ethic dative', morphologically expressed through a genitive NP, can only be explained by applying theories which recognise that syntactic phenomena are closely interrelated with semantico-pragmatic and 'extra-linguistic' ones and cannot be accounted for satisfactorily without a consideration of notions such as 'affect'. In particular, it can be shown that grammatical cases represent coherent categories with internal structure and are motivated both by historical evolution and by parallel synchronic structures. Grammatical constructions are to be attributed semantic characterizations through which they are crucially identified in the sense of Fillmore (1988). Ethic dative (or 'dative of interest') will be related to (recipient) IO dative, as well as prepositional phrases expressing goal. It will be shown that unless the links between constructions involving such elements are identified and explained, important generalizations are missed along with an explanation of the nature of such constructions and their motivation. We therefore intend to provide an account of ditransivity, prepositional complement constructions, (*I gave Mary a*

1. The comparative Indoeuropean tradition categorized *dativus ethicus* (Brugman and Delbrück 1911: 547, 556ff, Krahe 1972: 87ff) as a subclass of the dative of interest. Krahe recognises 6 distinct uses of IE dative and 5 subcategories of the dative of interest as follows: a) *dativus sympatheticus*, 'ἐφοβεῖτο Κῦρος, μή οἱ ὁ πάππος ἀποθάνῃ' 'Cyrus was afraid lest the grandfather should die on him', b) *dativus commodi et incommodi* 'οὐ τῷ πατρί καί τῇ μητρί μόνον γεγενήμεθα ἀλλά καί τῇ πατρίδι' 'we are not born only to our father and mother but also to our country', c) *dativus ethicus* 'καί μοι μή θορυβήσετε' 'do not alarm me', d) *dativus iudicantis*, 'οὐκ ὄνειδος οὐδέν ἡμῖν ἐστι λέγειν ταῦτα' 'we are not ashamed at all to be saying these things' and e) *dativus auctoris*, 'ποταμός τις ἡμῖν ἐστι διαβατέος' 'there is a river that we can cross'.

book, John gave a book to Mary, John sent a book to London), benefactives and anti-benefactives (*John baked Sally a cake*) and intransitive 'undergoer constructions' (*Princess Diana died on them*). Sections 2-4 deal with the syntax of MG ethic dative and its position in the network of syntactico-semantically related constructions, while section 5 focuses on its functions in the social framework motivating its use.

2. Previous accounts

To our knowledge, previous accounts of MG 'ethic genitive' (or ethic dative) are restricted to the classical work of Tzartzanos (1946) and Catsimali (1989). Its relation to similar Aroumanian constructions is touched upon in Katsanis and Dinas (1986), while Janda (1989, 1993) includes an extensive examination of the Czech dative and the Russian instrumental which seem to bear many similarities to the MG data. Out of the lengthy literature on dative constructions in English, we single out Gropen et al. (1989), Emonds (1993) and especially Goldberg (1992) who explicitly adopts a theoretical framework attributing the semantics directly on the construction. Tzartzanos (ibid. 120-126) identifies 21 functions of the genitive as a V-complement, which he classifies as belonging to 6 major categories grouped together on the basis of, more-or-less semantic, although inexplicit, criteria. As an illustration of the resulting confusion, consider the following examples which are allotted to distinct categories:

8. ανοίξτε μου να μπω 'open (for) me-GEN to enter' (§ 71: 5, with Vs implying friendly or unfriendly behaviour)
9. στρώσε του παιδιού να κοιμηθεί 'make the bed (for) the child-GEN to sleep' (§ 76: 3, benefactive)
10. θα σου αρρωστήσει το παιδί 'the child will fall ill (on) you-GEN' (§ 76: 2, ethic)
11. να του ζήσει εκείνο το παιδί 'let (for) him-GEN long live that child' (§ 76: 3, benefactive)

The boundaries between 'friendly behaviour', 'benefactive', and 'ethic' are anything but brought to light through the examples. One of the causes of Tzartzanos' problems is probably the fact that it is virtually impossible to circumscribe distinct categories with clear-cut boundaries, or to apply semantic criteria for categorization without taking the context into account. Hence: *τι μου λείπει* 'what me-GEN is missing' (§ 72: 2) is categorized as a case of ablative genitive signifying "lack". This is probably the case if what is missing is

"sugar" for instance, but not "my child". With the addition of the latter NP, the construction could well be interpreted as a case of 'ethic genitive'.

Similarly, a number of constructions like (8) above could be instances of benefactive dative (genitive of the beneficiary), not because of the inherent characteristics of the V, as Tzartzanos suggests, but because this is the most likely interpretation since the speaker expresses her wish to enter and therefore needs the door to be opened. Notice that *μου έκλεισε την πόρτα* '(to/for) me-GEN he/she shut the door' could be 'benefactive' or 'anti-benefactive' depending entirely on whether the act meets with the desires of the referent of the genitive NP or not.

In short, it seems unlikely that the type of genitive used depends entirely, or even essentially, on lexical characteristics of the V it complements, or that clear-cut semantic categorizations are in fact at all possible.

Interestingly, purely syntactic categorizations, of the type Government and Binding theory allowed for, present equally serious problems. Consider, for instance, Catsimali (1989) which is an excellent account of MG genitive within the Chomskyan framework of that time. On the basis of syntactic criteria like topicalization, Q-formation and passivization, Catsimali (ibid: 264-65) recognizes one category of genitives including both (IO) genitives subcategorizing bivalent Vs like *δίνω* 'give' and 'benefactive' / 'anti-benefactive' genitives accompanying monovalent verbs like *φτιάχνω* 'make'. For example:

12. μου έδωσε το βιβλίο 'me-GEN he/she gave the book'
13. μου έδωσε λύπη μεγάλη 'me-GEN he/she gave great sorrow'
14. μου έφτιαξε καφέ 'me-GEN he/she made coffee'

Notice, first, that this lumping together of IO and 'benefactive' genitives is necessitated by the theory, since only the accusative object has primary θ-role, while everything else (whether it be IO or not) receives secondary θ-role. Therefore, although in principle the difference between monovalent and bivalent V structures is recognised, in practice the theory does not provide for the syntactic distinction, since both genitives are to appear under the same node. On the other hand, *μου πονάει την/η ψυχή μου* 'me-GEN it hurts my soul' (ibid: 267) appears in a different category where the genitive occurs under a node within the VP rather than the V. Notice, however, that Q-formation and topicalization (which unifies IO and benefactive genitive structures) may also apply to these structures:

15. ποιανού πονάει το κεφάλι του; 'whose is hurting his head?'
16. της Μαίρης να δεις τι πονάει 'Mary's you should see what hurts'

while passivization cannot be applied in any of the cases presented so far. Moreover, what seem to be clear 'benefactives', e.g.:

17. μου έφτιαξε καφέ 'me-GEN he/she made coffee' (ibid: 264) and
18. μου έφτιαξε ένα παραμύθι 'me-GEN he/she made up a story' (ibid: 267)

appear in different categories for no obvious reason, since mappings between concrete and abstract domains are not accommodated within any Chomskyan framework.

The third category identified by Catsimali includes genitives traditionally called 'ethic', which appear under a node outside the VP since they are said to have scope over the whole sentence. Syntactic criteria being insufficient (e.g. neither the second nor the third category are paraphrasable with a PP), similar structures are again classified as belonging to categories C and B, exemplified by examples (19) and (20) respectively (ibid. 269, 267):

19. μου 'ρχονται Κυριακάτικα '(to) me-GEN they come on a Sunday'
20. μου ήρθε ο πατέρας (μου) '(to) me-GEN came my father'

We claim that although Catsimali recognizes the intricacy of the issue as well as its semantic and pragmatic implications, it is the theory she adopts that forces her to propose *ad hoc* solutions, like the addition of a 'lexical' case that GB does not cater for, and to leave the matter to be sorted out within relevance theory of pragmatics. But 'relevance' is expected to work on the already provided syntactic analysis and, in particular, to interpret ambiguity and C type genitives.

In this manner, the relation between the various occurrences of MG genitive is missed and their motivation is ignored, while it is not clear how relevance theory would show the internal structure of the genitive category, or its relationship with the dative of other IE languages, even if it fell within its goals.

The relation between syntactic, lexical and semantico-pragmatic information has to be given special attention in this connection and it is to that discussion that we will now turn.

3. Linguistic and extra-linguistic information

An extreme version of the independence of grammar from semantic considerations was advocated by structuralists. Bloomfield (1933), following the Saus-

surean tradition, but mainly his followers (e.g. Bloch 1948) argued that grammar must be seen as confined to the formal properties of language. Syntax was, thus, virtually left untouched, whereas semantics was consciously and conscientiously excluded from linguistic theory. These views were not the outcome of sheer neglect of the role of meaning in linguistic performance, but rather resulted from vigorous attempts to establish linguistics as a "science" and any account including meaning considerations could not be "scientific". Thus, the scope of linguistics was constrained so that certain specific goals could be more easily achieved.

The conviction that form is independent of meaning was not confined to structuralism. Chomsky retained and defended rigorously this basic structuralist assumption. His model of analysis focused on the formal aspects of language (reflecting the knowledge that native speakers have of the formal properties of their language) as opposed to analyses based on sets of utterances produced by the speakers. For Chomsky, linguistic theory should be concerned primarily with the tacit knowledge, i.e. the underlying linguistic ability of the ideal speaker in a homogeneous community. This is referred to as I- (internalized, intensional) language and is juxtaposed to E- (externalized, extensional) language, which amounts to a set of expressions or utterances similar to the corpora used by traditional structuralists. Knowledge of language is organized into separate modules of rules and principles. One module is occupied by syntax, a different one by semantics, a third by pragmatics and their relationship is uni-directional, with syntax being, in effect, central and unaffected by the subsequent modules. Syntax sets rules and dictates constraints on the information relevant to semantic processes. Semantic rules are strictly local, i.e. they do not consider elements lying deeper in the structure, and they are purely interpretive, i.e. they interpret only the structure provided by syntax, without ever creating any structure of their own (Larson and Segal 1995: 78-9).

Emonds (1993), advocating a transformational IO movement, considers that NP-PP sequences are the basis for direct/indirect object combinations and derives positionally identified IOs from PPs with an overt P. Such pairs of constructions exhibit cognitive synonymy, i.e. share their truth values. His general hypothesis is that "the universal deep structure of indirect objects is a PP" (ibid.: 228) and he represents it as [+PATH^NP,X] (ibid.: 229) where PATH implies +LOCATION and +GOAL. Notice that (i) semantic θ-roles are assigned to pre-existing structures, (ii) +LOCATION is termed a "syntactic feature" (ibid.: 256) and (iii) the rules Emonds advocates belong to "semantics determining universal principles of syntax" (ibid.: 260). These rules lead to semantic interpretation but are by no means derivable from semantic considerations.

Pragmatics, like semantics, involves the form and meaning of utterances but

also the speaker and consequently the addressee and the context. But once interactants enter the scene, one cannot exclude other features of context and in particular their shared knowledge, which were related to extra-linguistic aspects of performance in the previous literature. The attitudes of speakers and addressees, their inferences and presuppositions as well as considerations of appropriateness and politeness are taken into consideration. In fact, Brown and Levinson (1987: 262) contend that "politeness motives are one important reason why linguistic facts are exactly the way they are". We will not go into the details concerning the power of politeness motives. We will only note that it is uses of language involving interactants' feelings and social relationships, that is, the empathy involved in encounters, which mainly present problems in entirely formal analyses.

The complete exclusion of meaning, i.e. the complete autonomy of syntax, has come under severe attack and has been abandoned even by its most fervent supporters. The same must hold for positions supporting the priority or dependence of one level/module over the other. Thus, the most natural view seems to be the one which acknowledges the interaction of syntax and semantics/pragmatics. Semantics/pragmatics can be seen as the domain where meanings of words or constructions interact with features of context.

It is clear that the speaker's tacit knowledge of his/her native language is not restricted to syntax. The grammatical system is not acquired in a vacuum but within its social matrix and the speaker's knowledge of the language includes aspects of appropriate use which may defy strict grammatical analyses. For instance, one can hardly analyse personal pronouns systematically while ignoring the fact that some pronouns identify the speaker, and some others the addressee, or that the same pronoun may refer to one or more addressees depending on the social relationship of the participants. Thus, terms like "communicative competence" (Hymes 1974) and "sociocultural competence" have been introduced to account for the knowledge needed to apply the abstract grammatical rules appropriately.

MG genitive can provide evidence pointing to the interrelationship of syntax and semantics/pragmatics, which could be envisaged as a continuum. One determining factor seems to be if and to what extent the description and explanation of a certain form or construction requires reference to features outside the purely syntactic system, i.e. the contexts in which it can be employed. First, there are cases where syntax plays the determining role, i.e. which are unaffected by context, as for instance, agreement rules (excepting honorific plurals) or some morphophonemic phenomena. There are, however, cases where the reverse seems to be the case, i.e. grammatical constructions which can only be described and explained by making explicit reference to semantico-pragmatic factors of the

elements involved. Here one could include respect forms which are a universal feature of languages. Honorific and passive constructions provide, beyond their formal properties and propositional content, information concerning the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. The speaker, in choosing one rather than another related construction, can express deference or familiarity with the addressee. Between these more-or-less clear-cut cases other linguistic phenomena may occupy intermediate positions in the continuum.

Ethic dative (or genitive for MG) is an instance of the last case mentioned above. It provides further evidence in support of the claim that syntax and semantics/pragmatics are intricately interrelated.

4. An alternative analysis

To show the actual relation of ethic genitive to other genitives within the system of MG, it is necessary to start with the indirect object dative (IO). It must be pointed out that standard analyses of the English IO assume that it is expressed as a prepositional phrase. Recall that in accordance with Chomsky's S-tandard Theory, the deep structure contained structures like *John gave a book to Mary* on which a T-rule (Dative Shift) was supposed to operate and transform it to the surface structure *John gave Mary a book.* In contrast to this, MG IO genitive is the equivalent of ancient Greek IO dative which disappeared (morphologically) along with all other datives.

In MG, verbs can collocate with nouns in the genitive, but most frequently with the short forms of the personal pronoun. The main reason for this is that constructions with a noun in the genitive can be converted into prepositional phrases, whereas the genitive of pronouns cannot be easily paraphrased. In other words, although MG can also express the IO both as a case (genitive) and as a PP, there is good reason to assume that the former rather than the latter is to be considered as the more basic structure of the two. We will therefore start the analysis with the genitive IO as it can be used to express a typical action involving a typical Agent, a typical Patient/Theme and a typical Recipient of the action described through ditransitive verbs:

21. μου έδωσε την επιταγή 'me-GEN he/she gave the cheque'
22. της χάρισαν αυτοκίνητο '(to) her-GEN they donated a car'
23. τους μοιράσαμε βιβλία '(to) them-GEN we distributed books'

Janda (1989: 4 and 1993: 55) uses the following schema to represent such actions:



Schema 1

This figure is meant simply as an illustration of the types of relationship outlined by Talmy (1986) and Langacker (1987) and the canonical profiles of these three cases in Smith (1985). Janda (1993: 54) notes that this schema is also in harmony with Jacobson's specification of the dative as signifying "peripheral status and involvement in the action". Evidently, MG 'dative' is simply to be replaced by 'genitive' in Janda's schema. We will further identify and number the thematic roles of these cases for ease of reference:



Schema 2

In this figure, I stands for the Nominative Agent which is the carrier of all the prototypical properties of an agent: human, volitional, the source of energy, responsible for the completion of action; II stands for the Accusative Patient/Theme, bearing all the prototypical properties of a typical patient: concrete, inanimate, target of the energy under the absolute control of I; III is the Genitive (Dative) Recipient, typically human, which becomes the new possessor of II under the Agent's initiative. Therefore, through the action expressed by the verb, II enters the sphere of control/influence of III. It is our view that all the datives/genitives mentioned in sections 1 and 2, far from being cases of accidental homonymy or realisations of an abstract 'affected entity' feature, are to be understood as part of the dative/genitive network, instances of polysemy which belong to a radial category, the prototype of which we identify as

the recipient of a prototypically agentive action involving a human recipient. A similar view of 'constructional polysemy' with respect to the English IO is offered in Goldberg (1992: 51). The central sense of the ditransitive construction is identified in Goldberg as involving "the successful transfer of an object to a recipient" (ibid.). As characteristics of this central sense she posits "concrete transfer" and "successful transfer". Interestingly, she rejects the notion 'affected' (as characterizing the recipient) on the following grounds (ibid: 53):

(i) Dative IOs are no more affected than prepositionally introduced NPs in English.
(ii) In cases like 'x baked y a cake' y may never receive the cake and may not even know about it; it cannot therefore be said to be 'affected'.

Although we agree that 'affected' is not to be understood as an abstract feature, investing all dative constructions with uniform meaning, we disagree with Goldberg's claim at this point even considering the English data alone. 'Affected' is to be included as an essential condition characterizing the prototype/central sense of Dative ditransitive constructions. Examples like (ii) above constitute deviations from the prototype in those cases (of unaffectedness) that Goldberg mentions. On theoretical grounds, it is unacceptable to restrict the 'central sense' to features which are only relevant for accounts based on necessary and sufficient conditions. The semantic link between the various meanings of the MG genitive discussed here relies on evident metaphorical structuring between source and target domains within a single category, the members of which deviate from its prototype in systematic ways explainable through 'revisions' of specific features of the prototype described above[2].

The part of the genitive network we are interested in involves typically first, second and third person personal pronouns, although it is by no means restricted to them[3]. We consider examples (24)-(26) to be typical of a straightforward mapping from a concrete source domain, as exemplified in (21)-(23), to an abstract target domain:

2. Metaphorical mappings are understood here in the sense of Lakoff (1987), Sweetser (1990), Nikiforidou (1991), among others.
3. Tzartzanos (1946), Catsimali (1987) and Katsanis and Dinas (1986) talk about first person pronouns in this connection precisely because pre-verbal personal pronoun clitics in the first, and more rarely in the second, person are the commonest expressions of ethic genitive. The generality of the phenomenon is missed through such unwarranted restriction. We think that talking about more-or-less 'typical' uses is a better way to account for the data.

24. μου είπαν τα νέα 'me-GEN they told the news'
25. σου διηγήθηκε μια ιστορία 'you-GEN he/she told a story'
26. τους εξήγησα το πρόβλημα '(to) them-GEN I explained the problem'

Notice that I and III are still typical as agent and recipient, respectively, while II is abstract rather than concrete (i.e. 'signal', 'message', 'information') but otherwise still within the control of I, which passes it on to III and makes it therefore available to, and within the sphere of control of, the human recipient. Due to the abstract nature of II, the recipient acquires II and is in that sense affected by it. He/She is in possession of knowledge/information originating in I and is to that extent affected. Schema 2 remains the same and the concrete – abstract metaphorical mapping of II is the only difference. Examples like:

27. μου αγόρασαν αυτοκίνητο 'me-GEN they bought a car'
28. σου μαγείρεψα μουσακά '(for) you-GEN I cooked musaka'
29. τους φτιάξαμε κέηκ '(for) them-GEN we made a cake'

involve the type of genitive categorised as 'genitive of the beneficiary'. Notice that if the predicate is monovalent, MG (unlike Czech, Aroumanian and Russian, see Janda 1993) uses a genitive of the recipient only if I and III are not correferential. Notice also that the referent of the genitive NP bears once again all the typical properties of a recipient, although syntactically this genitive is no longer an IO. I is still a typical agent bringing II within the sphere of control of III. An appropriate schema to represent this part of the network could be:



Schema 3

What brings all such cases together in syntactic terms is the possibility of replacing genitives with a *για/σε* 'for/to' PP specifying for whose sake I's action takes place.

The deviation from the prototype consists in that the agent's action does not require a recipient to be accomplished. If this action is performed for the sake or in the interest of a person other than the agent, the genitive will be used to

express the person affected positively by the agent's action. If this action affects the recipient adversely, the same construction will be used. The negative affect looks as if it were the direct consequence of the intrinsic semantic properties of the verb, for example:

30. μου χτύπησαν το πόδι (μου) 'me-GEN they hurt (my) foot'
31. σου έκλεψαν την τσάντα (σου) 'you-GEN they stole (your) bag'
32. της κατέστρεψες το σπίτι (της) 'her-GEN you destroyed (her) house'

Examples such as (27)-(32) illustrate the traditional classification of the genitive (dative) as benefactive and anti-benefactive, respectively. Notice, however, that they only constitute typical instances of such subcategories and do not take the context into consideration. Practically any verb could be used in such constructions, and with the appropriate contextual information the resulting effect on III (the recipient or the person affected by the act) could be positive or negative, for example:

33. μου χτύπησε τον ώμο (μου) 'me-GEN he/she beat (my) shoulder' (in a friendly manner or aggressively)
34. τους μαγείρεψα σαλιγκάρια '(for) them-GEN I cooked snails' (which they like or hate)

In short, the positive–negative affect on III is in effect a contextual rather than a lexical matter and should not be used to subcategorise verbs.

Consider now the internal structure of that part of the network which includes constructions such as those in (27)-(34). Notice first that (30)-(33) can receive an additional optional possessive *μου* 'my' after II, i.e. I acts on II which belongs to III. More central members of this category will therefore involve part–whole or inalienable possessions of III (typically parts of III's body) as in (30) and (33); less typical ones require a simple mapping from inalienable to alienable possessions and from concrete to abstract domains, for example:

35. μου διέλυσε την οικογένεια 'me-GEN he/she destroyed (my) family'

The only significant difference between subcategories represented in schemata 2 and 3 is therefore a contextual matter, depending on how closely related the accusative patient is to the genitive recipient:

27b. *μου φροντίζουν το σπίτι (μου) όταν λείπω* '(for) me-GEN they take

care of (my) house when I am away'

28b. μας προσέχουν το παιδί (μας) στις διακοπές '(for) us-GEN they look after (our) child (when we are) on vacation'

These are examples of 'possessives' (as the possibility of the occurrence of the possessive pronoun attests) paraphrasable with *για* just like in examples (27)-(29). On the other hand, examples like:

30b. τους έκλεισαν το μαγαζί (τους) '(to) them-GEN they shut (their) shop'

31b. μου (τον) πέθαναν τον άνδρα μου '(to) me-GEN they died (my) husband'

32b. μου (το) αρρώστησαν το παιδί μου '(to) me-GEN they got-ill (my) child'

are exactly parallel to (30)-(32), i.e. 'possessives' non-paraphrasable with *για* 'for' NP under normal circumstances, for the obvious syntactico-semantico-pragmatic reason that their content can hardly be construed as being in the interest or for the benefit of III.

An important distinction within the possessive category involves whether paraphrases with *σε* 'to' or *από* 'from' PP can be substituted for the genitive, corresponding to Goal and Source-oriented actions, respectively. It seems plausible to associate cases like (31) to Source-oriented genitives (e.g. *μου αφαίρεσε τον όγκο* '(from) me-GEN he/she took away the tumor', *μου έβγαλε το αγκάθι* '(from) me-GEN he/she took out the thorn') and cases like (30) to Goal-oriented ones (e.g. *μου έβαλε τον επίδεσμο στο πόδι* '(to) me-GEN he/she put the bandage on (my) leg').

Schema 4 (a slight adaptation of 2) is appropriate for possession and both Source and Goal constructions:



Schema 4

I acts on II which already belongs to III. In all these cases II is within the sphere of control of III who is thus affected by I's intervention. Expectedly,

there is overlap between possessive and benefactive as attested in examples such as:

36. μου έβαλε νερό στο ποτήρι 'me-GEN he/she poured water into the glass'
37. μας άνοιξαν την πόρτα 'us-GEN they opened the door'
38. τους σέρβιρα τεκίλα 'them-GEN I served tequila'

Notice that in all the cases presented so far, I is a typical agent, II is a typical patient and III a typical recipient.

But the genitive in question is also present in the absence of a patient, i.e. of an accusative marking the person affected by I's activity, as in (39)-(41):

4a
39. μου χαμογέλασε '(at) me-GEN s/he smiled'
40. σου έβαλε τις φωνές '(at) you-GEN s/he screamed'
41. τους θύμωσα '(at) you-GEN I got angry'

or I's state as in (42)-(44)

4b
42. μου βρωμάει το ψάρι 'me-GEN stinks the fish'
43. του αρέσει το σκοτάδι 'he-GEN likes the dark
44. σας τέλειωσε το πετρέλαιο 'you-GEN run out of oil/petrol'

Schema 5 is proposed as a pictorial representation of this particular deviation from the prototype and the arrow stands for the activity of the referent of the nominative (examples (39)-(41) or for the state of the referent of the theme (examples (42)-(44)).



Schema 5

The deviation consists in I's gradually losing typical agent characteristics (e.g. intensionality) in (41) and ending up as a theme (e.g. (42)-(44)). The accusative is absent, but the nominative still stands for whichever entity is considered the

cause of the state of affairs signified by the verb and the genitive still stands for the human recipient who is directly affected by that state of affairs. The status of the genitive is only slightly differentiated from one (sub)category to the next.

Consider, for instance, the next set of examples which we posit as the link between the subcategories exemplified in (30)-(32) and (42)-(44), respectively:

45. μου πονάει το κεφάλι (μου) 'me-GEN hurts (my) head'
46. μας κόπηκαν οι ελπίδες (μας) 'us-GEN were lost (our) hopes'
47. τους λείπει το παιδί (τους) 'they-GEN are missing (their) child'



Schema 6

In (45) and (47) the nominative (I) stands for an entity which is part of III and it is affected as a whole by what happens to I, paralleling the constructions in schema 2. The overall construct represents an event rather than an act, parallel to schema 5 constructions (especially examples (42)-(44)).

The central members of what has been traditionally called 'ethic dative/genitive' involve events or states which affect the referent of the genitive through empathy, e.g.

48. σου αρρώστησε το παιδί (σου); '(on) you-GEN it fell sick (your) child?'
49. της κλαίει το μωρό (της) 'her-GEN it is crying (her) baby'
50. μου στεναχωρήθηκες άδικα 'me-GEN you got upset for no reason'
51. μας χάθηκε ο Νίκος '(on) us-GEN he got lost Nick'
52. της είχανε μεθύσει καμμιά 15αριά πιτσιρίκια '(on) her-GEN they had got drunk some 15 teenagers'

The nominative stands for the entity which undergoes whatever the verb signifies, while the genitive stands for the recipient of the repercussions of the event. With human referents for I, the event is construed as happening to III indirectly, as it immediately concerns an entity belonging to III (examples (48), (49)) or for which III has undertaken responsibility ((50)-(52)). This sums up the specific proposal we offer for our Greek data. In the next section we

compare Greek to English and make more general suggestions as to how ditransitivity phenomena are to be handled.

5. English vs. Greek: ditransitivity and affect

Two main issues need to be addressed at this point. One of them is the nature of the principles responsible for IO and ethic dative constructions, and the other one has to do with the relative positions of such constructions within networks formally including conceptually similar constructions. Accounts of English data (see section 1) focus on the asymmetry between prepositionally and positionally identified dative and benefactive constructions:

'I wrote a letter to John' - 'I wrote John a letter'
but: 'I recommended Sally to the Dean' - '*I recommended the Dean Sally'

'I baked a cake for Alice' - 'I baked Alice a cake'
but: 'I iced a cake for Alice' - '?I iced Alice a cake'

The nature of the principles which could provide an explanation of the attested asymmetry has been debated. The relevant operations have been identified as being either syntactic and structure-preserving, or lexical and semantic, or a combination of the two, or attributable to the semantics of the construction. In short, it seems that practically all logical possibilities have been covered, tracing distinct points in the history of modern linguistic analysis and distinct theoretical affiliations.

One of the main arguments of those who adopt the lexical-semantic approach (e.g. Gropen et al. 1989) is in fact the ungrammaticality of formally similar constructions like:

'Amy took the road to Chicago' - '*Amy took Chicago the road'

This seems to us to be the consequence of unwarranted reliance on purely formal characteristics. The prepositionally introduced NP in such constructions is only formally identical to a human recipient IO but is in fact the realization of a purely spatial Goal, which cannot be construed as a recipient. Typical Goal realizations are, expectedly, spatially defined entities, i.e. NPs occupying place II. Typical recipient realizations are necessarily human and, in our view, *by definition* 'affected' as having become the new possessor of the DO. The unaccept-

ability of **Amy took Chicago the road* is to be attributed to the implausibility of construing typical goal realizations as (affected) recipients. Moreover, we claim that in those cases where the IO can be construed as being affected by the transference of the DO even in the absence of the animacy condition, positionally identified datives are possible, e.g. *The paint job gave the car a higher sale price* (example in Goldberg 1992: 61).

In view of the above it is probably useful to identify two distinct prototypes, one for Caused Transfer Events as in *John gave Mary the book* and one for Caused Motion Events as in *John threw the ball to the wall.* Since the recipient can be easily understood as a goal, prepositionally introduced IOs are also a possibility in both English and Greek, e.g. *John gave the book to Mary, ο Γιάννης έδωσε το βιβλίο στη Μαίρη.* The reverse is clearly not the case: the place where motion of an object ends is not easily construable as a recipient. Accounting for ungrammaticality through lexical semantic features like [+animate] will take care of asymmetries like **χάρισε της βιβλιοθήκης τα βιβλία του* 'he donated the library-GEN his books' vs. *χάρισε τα βιβλία του στη βιβλιοθήκη* 'he donated his books to the library' in MG. But notice that equally inanimate NPs can 'dativize', e.g. *αυτός ο φωτισμός του έδωσε του κτιρίου μεγαλοπρέπεια* 'this lighting has given the building-GEN grandeur'. Construal and conceptualization of events are not likely to be done away with and replaced by simply syntactic, simply semantic, lexical or other features.

Benefactives (and anti-benefactives) have been shown to be relatable to typical 'give' IO constructions via typical, although neither necessary nor sufficient, recipient characteristics like humanness and affectedness. Ethic datives have been shown to share these typical conditions with other affected recipient constructions like 'give' IOs and can also be shown to be related to conceptually similar 'affect' constructions in MG. Where the first plural is used for single referents, e.g. *είμαστε ντροπαλές* 'we are shy' (said by a mother referring to the behaviour of her daughter), their relation to pure Goal constructions is completely indirect and is mediated by IO datives.

It is possible that the principles governing ditransitivity and affect are language specific, to some extent. Thus, MG data do not require lexically determined classes of verbs to be accounted for, while English may do so. Yet it is interesting to notice that those verb-classes standardly allowing positionally identifiable datives in English constitute more typical dative constructions when translated into Greek than others. Besides, the informal character of ethic dative constructions in Greek may be understood as running parallel to the distinction in English between Anglo-Saxon origin verbs and 'borrowed' or Latinate ones (Emonds 1993: 255-6), where only the former type allow for positionally identified datives. On the other hand, 'affectedness' can be related

with 'emotiveness', and Greek tends to express this through syntactic means to a much greater extent than English. The actual relationship between social factors like informality or affect and constructions will be taken up in the next section, where the role of socio-cultural parameters on syntax are discussed.

6. Socio-cultural pressure exerted on syntax

Cases of sociocultural pressure which have received considerable attention by researchers are the honorific systems and the active/passive constructions. The interesting feature shared by the above categories is that they provide, beyond their propositional content, information concerning the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. The speaker's selection encodes his or her expression of appropriate deference or familiarity with the addressee, or in other words, indicates where the speaker positions him/herself in relation to his or her addressee.

This notion of the speaker's involvement or identification with his or her interlocutor is succinctly reflected in the term *empathy* (Kuno and Kaburaki, 1977). Thus, the identities of the interactants and the degree of involvement intended play a determining role for the motivation of specific constructions. Consequently, both grammatical constraints and social parameters should be taken into consideration in order to understand the very existence, the marginality, or even the unacceptability of certain constructions.

Both honorific and passive constructions are well known, have been extensively studied and are perhaps universal in some form or other. The MG dative/genitive and the IE dative more generally, constitute less familiar areas of grammar which provide further support for the necessity to incorporate both grammatical and social considerations into any account of linguistic phenomena. It is argued here that this MG construction not only defies any strict grammatical analysis but also clearly reflects the necessity to refer to features outside the purely linguistic domain to account for its existence. As Warburton (1977: 261) notes, the syntax of such elements is poorly understood.

It is also claimed that this feature is related to the particular social system and, in Brown and Levinson's ([1978]1987) terms, reflects the positive politeness orientation of Greek society (Sifianou, 1992). This suggestion seems to account for the fact that constructions with ethic dative (genitive) are not found in English, a society which exhibits a strong preference for negative politeness devices.

MG ethic dative/genitive is commonly expressed with personal pronouns, mainly because constructions with a genitive noun can be converted into

prepositional phrases, whereas the genitive of pronouns cannot be easily paraphrased (Mackridge 1985: 61), e.g.

53. γιατί μου στενοχωριέσαι; 'why (for/to) me-GEN are you feeling upset?'

As has already been pointed out such genitives can be attached to almost any verb in rather simple constructions. They are optional elements, and at first sight they appear to be syntactically unproblematic. However, closer inspection reveals that this rather simple picture presents serious problems if a purely formal analysis is attempted.

A purely formal account is unable to recognise an independent status for such pronouns. Thus, although they play no role in completing the argument structure of the construction to which they are added, they are assigned object positions and are "forced" to behave under the same restrictions as object pronouns do. For instance, the pronoun *μου* in *τι μου κάνεις;* 'how are you (for me)?', which is not an object but a deletable ethic genitive, occupies the same position as *μου* in *τι μου δίνεις;* 'what are you giving me?', where *μου* clearly functions as the object of the verb and cannot be omitted without affecting meaning or creating ambiguity. In those cases where ditransitive verbs are involved, ethic genitive occupies the position of the indirect object. However, constructions with ethic genitive can occur with monotransitive verbs and the personal pronoun still occupies the position of the indirect object, despite the fact that some of these verbs take only direct objects. For example:

54. να μου τρως καλά 'you should for/to me-GEN eat well'

What is perhaps more interesting is that even intransitive verbs can occur in constructions with an ethic genitive. For example:

55. μη μου τρέχεις 'don't (for/to) me-GEN run'

Any formal account may either assign optional pronominal objects to such verbs, creating rather than solving problems, or incorporate them into an existing empty category, or attempt to posit a new one, or fail to take them into consideration. Furthermore, although ethic genitives tend to appear in constructions involving verbs, they can also be found with adverbs. For example:

56. καλώς τον μου 'welcome-ADV him (for/to) me-GEN'

The conclusion which can easily be drawn from this brief account is that en-

tirely formal accounts can offer a partial explanation for the existence of some constructions involving an ethic genitive. It may be the case that since such pronouns perform no grammatical role and are void of propositional content, they have no real reason for grammatical existence and therefore grammars are incapable of offering them any status.

Despite the fact that grammar may deny an independent status to such pronouns or even fail to recognise their existence in some cases, they are optional elements frequently encountered in everyday informal interactions and perform an interesting sociopragmatic role. They are usually exchanged by interactants of equal status in existing relationships. In the first person, they denote a speaker who is interested in the content of the whole utterance, thus expressing his or her pleasure or displeasure, joy or sorrow for what is happening and they therefore contribute involvement to the exchange. For example:

57. τι μου κάνεις; 'what (for/to) me-GEN are you doing?' 'how are you'

This is not just a common conventional greeting conventionally requesting information concerning the addressee's well-being but goes further and assures the addressee that his or her well-being is of direct concern to the speaker as well.

In the second person it is usually used as a means of eliciting the addressee's attention and/or interest in the content of the whole utterance. For example:

58. θα σου καεί το φαγητό 'will (for/to) you-GEN get burnt the food'

It is clear that syntactic and social factors interact and determine the acceptability of such constructions. It was mentioned earlier that ethic genitives seem typically to occur with first and second person personal pronouns. Grammar seems to be unable to offer any explanation for this preference. If, however, we perceive these constructions as linguistic means available to speakers who want to express their closeness to specific addressees in particular exchanges, then it becomes clear why third person pronouns are unlikely in such constructions. For example:

59. *τι του/της κάνεις; 'what (for/to) him/her-GEN are you doing?'

The unacceptability of the above construction with an ethic reading must be due to the fact that it refers to a third person and not directly to either the speaker or the addressee. In other words, the speaker cannot express his or her own feelings of concern in this rather indirect way.

An utterance like

60. πώς μου/μας οδηγείς έτσι; 'how (for/to) me/us-GEN are you driving in this way?'

cannot be addressed by a policeman to an offender, even if the formal plural is employed, because the necessary close relationship between individuals who are truly or conventionally concerned for each other, which motivates such constructions, is lacking.

The necessary presence of the relevant contextual features relating mainly to participants becomes evident also in cases of possible ambiguity. When ditransitive verbs are involved, ambiguity will creep in and features of context rather than different underlying structures must be sought for an adequate explanation. For example, in:

61. τι μου γράφεις εκεί; 'what (for/to) me-GEN are you writing there?'

μου can be the indirect object of the verb in many environments, but if uttered by a mother to a toddler scribbling on a piece of paper it can also function as ethic genitive. In the former case, it is a question requesting factual or propositional information, whereas in the latter it is not a request for such information but an expression of involvement and endearment. Similarly, *πότε θα μου διαβάσεις;* 'when are you going (for/to) me-GEN to read/study' can be ambiguous out of context, but in context one reading is easily ruled out.

It should be noted here that ethic genitives are frequently used by mothers addressing their children to indicate affection, concern and sympathy. For example:

62. μου βγάζει δοντάκι το μωρό μου '(for/to) me-GEN is teething my baby'
63. έλα μη μου κλαις 'come on (for/to) me-GEN don't cry'
64. να μου προσέχεις 'you should (for/to) me-GEN be careful'

Thus, it is clear that we can arrive at a correct interpretation of any such utterance only if the necessary contextual features are known. Furthermore, for an utterance to allow an ethic reading, it must closely relate to the speaker and/or the addressee. Notice that when the addressee is not specific, is unknown, or is the general public, such constructions cannot have an ethic reading. For example:

65. δε μου/μας διαβάζει η νεολαία 'not (for/to) me/us-GEN read the youth today'.

An ethic reading could be appropriate only if the outcome described in the utterance directly affects the speaker, as for instance in:

66. μας μένουν έγκυος οι πωλήτριες και φεύγουν '(for/to) us-GEN get pregnant the assistants and leave'

said by a manager.

Although as mentioned above, constructions with an ethic genitive are frequently addressed by mothers to children, they are also used among adults to indicate the strong concern of the speaker for the physical or psychological state of his or her addressee. The inclusion of the ethic genitive creates a solidary atmosphere in which the speaker expresses sympathy towards the addressee. In many cases there is also an implicit offer of help and support, because it is assumed that whatever affects favourably or adversely the addressee will have some bearing on the speaker, too.

In some cases the speaker's pragmatic message is that he or she knows what it is beneficial for the addressee and is telling him or her this. For example:

67. δε θέλω να μου φοβάσαι/ντρέπεσαι 'I don't want that (for/to) me-GEN you be afraid/ashamed'

The speaker knows that feeling shy or scared is disadvantageous and is telling or reminding the addressee for his or her own benefit. This also explains, the frequency and acceptability of *να μου τρως καλά* 'you should for me-GEN eat well', since it is advisable for people to control their diet carefully, and the infrequency or even unacceptability of *να μου πίνεις καλά* 'you should for me-GEN drink well' because drinking is not an issue for which a considerate speaker gives advice.

All cases involving ethic genitive constructions in MG are options available to language users who may or may not employ them. Their use may reflect a tendency towards less formal language sprinkled with other features of in-group identity, such as diminutives. Those who are less prone to this type of informality will eschew their use. In both cases they can become the source of joking, as in (68) B below:

68. A: συγγνώμη που σου τηλεφωνώ τόσο πρωί αλλά ήθελα να μη μου φύγεις

'sorry for ringing you so early in the morning but I wanted that not (for/to) me-GEN you leave'

B: δε θα σου φύγω, ετοιμαζόμουνα να σου έρθω
'not will (for/to) you-GEN I leave just I was getting ready that (for/to) you-GEN I come'

The use of the genitives in the answer renders it ungrammatical strictly speaking but acceptable in such jocular contexts.

Such constructions can also convey irony. Leech (1983: 142) proposes an Irony Principle, which although of lesser importance in his theory, it explains how speakers can be impolite in a seemingly polite way. Here it is not a matter of being more or less polite, but rather more or less concerned. The insincerity involved may be more or less obvious but becomes clear from the absurdity of the statement, according to Leech (ibid.: 143). For example:

69. μου παντρεύτηκαν τα πουλάκια μου 'me-GEN got married my little birds'

ironically said about two elderly people, involving a construction featuring not only ethic dative *μου*, but also the diminutive form of the NP characteristically used for children.

The fact that these constructions can only partially be rendered in English is not surprising, because they reflect the different orientation of the two societies concerning the relative focus on interpersonal involvement (see Tannen 1983). Many of the features which characterise speech can be understood as serving this need for involvement. Mackridge (1985: 339) notes that "effusiveness is a highly valued and sometimes obligatory component of behaviour between people" in Greece, in contrast to northern European countries. Consequently, it is the different extent to which people value interpersonal involvement which can easily explain the lack of similar constructions in English. As far as politeness is concerned, such differences point to a divergence in terms of relatively more positive versus more negative politeness orientation of societies in Brown and Levinson's ([1978]1987) terminology.

Consequently, one should be extremely cautious before attributing such linguistic differences either to the inferiority or superiority of languages or to the mental and intellectual background of their users. Comparing Greek with Aroumanian which exhibits a higher frequency and a wider variety of the phenomenon, Katsanis and Dinas (1986) conclude that such uses of the genitive/dative indicate a less cultivated society with "unimportant" cultural back-

ground. As already pointed out in section 1, while a number of European and non-European languages have similar constructions, Czech also exhibits a wider variety of the phenomenon (Janda, 1989). An explanation of such variation could be explained in sociocultural, historical and typological terms, as we have attempted to do comparing Greek to English, but moral evaluations of the sort offered for Aroumanian are clearly unacceptable.

7. Conclusions

In conclusion, it seems unlikely that the genitive in MG, whether 'personal', 'ethic', 'benefactive' or otherwise, is to be accounted for either

(a) as a lexical subcategorization issue, or
(b) as a purely syntactic, purely semantic or purely pragmatic phenomenon.

It is, on the contrary, fairly obvious that its presence depends on the interaction of three cognitive domains, namely (i) agentivity, (ii) possession, (iii) affectedness of the recipient, all which are graded (allowing for degrees of representation) and motivate presence or absence of the accusative (i), and presence of the genitive (ii and iii).

Although the relation between 'language' and 'affect' as Talmy (1997) puts it is clearest in cases of 'empathy' genitives, like (48)-(52) above, it is implausible in MG to isolate these from other subcategories directly or indirectly related to the indirect object (old dative) or the genitive of possession (related to the old ablative). In particular, we claim that (a) the Source-Goal distinction which is relevant in many different domains (see Jackendoff 1990), (b) the phenomenon of agentivity which is well understood (see Hopper and Thompson 1982) and (c) the various ways of accounting for the genitive via possession and mappings between cognitive domains involving the genitive in different Indo-European languages which are equally well-understood (Nikiforidou 1991) and which are all independently motivated and widespread throughout language, are sufficient in themselves to take care of MG genitives. They are probably sufficient for Slavic and Rumanian datives, Russian ablatives (Janda 1993), etc.

The 'benefactive'-'anti-benefactive' categorization is the direct result of cognitive factors provided by contextual information and does not require independent motivation. Benefactive and anti-benefactive genitives can be seen as stemming from dative (goal) and ablative (source) schemata respectively,

both of which have been replaced by genitive constructions in MG. The former is best instantiated in typically agentive (goal) 'give' constructions, the latter by typically ablative (source) 'take away' constructions.

It may well be the case that if the former type is activated, in typical cases, the recipient is beneficially affected (acquires a desired entity and therefore adds to her possessions). In less typical cases, the theme/patient/object changing hands affects the recipient adversely. If something is taken away, however, the referent of the genitive is adversely affected, at least in typical cases. Nevertheless, the reverse is expectedly also possible.

If something happens to be part of the receiver (understood as a whole), the receiver as a whole is affected. A simple mapping from concrete to abstract domains and an equally simple one from inalienable to alienable possessions are required to complete the picture. Within the sphere of 'possessions' or receiver's 'sphere of control' (as Janda 1993 understands it), we consider parts of receiver's body to constitute the prototype and the receiver's belongings, animate or inanimate, to constitute deviations from it. Whatever happens to these latter entities affects the receiver more or less directly and is, in that sense, interpretable as being or entering her sphere of affectedness.

English, which has been so extensively analysed, exhibits little overlap between the systems of 'language' and 'affect' on the morphosyntactic level, as it rarely makes use of unified syntactic means to express affect (e.g. *my plants died* on me, *she did the shopping* for me, **the doctor killed our son* against us, **the fish stinks* to me, **she destroyed my family* for me). The study of this overlap is perhaps best approached via data from languages with a morphologically marked case system, well-attested historical origins of morphologically marked thematic roles, and a more explicit involvement of affect on surface constructions.

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