In this article Ι explore the epistemology of the inquisitive stance, i.e. what we know or what we believe when we ask. The inquisitive stance differs from the assertive stance, which is bound by the Veridicality Principle (Grice 1975, Giannakidou 1997, 1998, Giannakidou & Mari 2016, 2018, 2021, 2026): unless lying or wanting to deceive, the speaker utters a content that she knows to be true or has reasons to believe that it is true. A question is posed from a position of uncertainty. Uncertainty is gradual and comes in three forms: (a) complete ignorance, (b) uncertainty with bias and, as I will newly propose, (c) Socratic aporia, which is a state of reflection without the expectation of a complete and true answer. In a true Tsohatzidian sense, we can view these three as distinct speech acts that allow us to witness the interaction between propositional content and speaker’s intention. Bias and aporia are manifested in the syntax often with the use of modal elements and their existence suggests that the borderline between asserting and questioning are not categorical (as is often assumed) but rather fluid. Syntactic speech act accounts can certainly not capture the distinctions.